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as a court. The cases examined do not attempt to differentiate judicial and administrative duties of the court when it
is acting as such.
On the other hand, the authority is to the effect that any
interference with property in the hands of a receiver, without leave of court, or any criticism within the rule 9 directed
toward the judge accusing him of bias or prejudice, is a
contempt of court.10 If the essential elements of contempt
(as required by the Judicial Code) had been present in the
Craig Case, supra, the appellate court would probably have
sustained the judgment below.
Is, then, the contention sound on principle? It is believed
that it would be impractical to draw a line between administrative and judicial functions in a case involving a receivership. Court supervision, apparently, is necessary to
protect the rights of all parties at every stage in the proceedings. In this respect, a judge passing on the management of a business in the hands of a receiver differs in no
practical way from a judge presiding in a trial between two
individuals. Moreover, if such a distinction should be made
between the two duties, confusion must inevitably arise.
It would be exceedingly difficult to make a rule applicable
to all cases. The judge, consequently, would be hampered
in his work, and thereby would be rendered less efficient.
-H. F. PORTERFIELD.

PARTITION-JURISDICTION OF EQUITY COURT TO DETERMINE

QUESTION OF TITLE ARISING THEREIN.-Section 1, Chapter 79
of the WEST VIRGINIA CODE provides that "Tenants in common, joint tenants and co-parceners shall be compellable to
make partition, and the circuit court of the county wherein
the land lies shall have jurisdiction of partition, and in the
exercise of such may take cognizance of all questions of
law affecting the legal title that may arise in any proceeding." This statute does not indicate whether the proceedO Supra, n. 7.
10

Kneisel v. Ursus Motor Co., 316 Ill. 336; 147 N. E. 243; 39 A. L. R. 1 (1925).
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ing should be at law or in equity. However, on account of
the inconvenience and difficulty of proceedings at law,
equity early assumed jurisdiction in partition proceedings
under this statute and determines questions of title, but only
where such questions are incidental to the partition proceedings.1 For example, the courts have not gone so far as
to allow partition proceedings to be used as a substitute for
ejectment, or where title is denied under which partition is
sought, or where title depends on doubtful questions of law
or facts. In such cases the equity court will dismiss the
bill or refuse relief until the right to partition is determined
at law, because ofne claiming under a strange title should
not be compelled to submit his title to a court of equity.2 The

statute above quoted has been construed many times. In
its most recent construction 3 our Supreme Court has held
that equity had jurisdiction by virtue of this section under
the following facts: Plaintiff and defendant were heirs at
law of X. Plaintiff's bill alleged that X, by a will, left a
life estate in realty to Y, and Y, having died, plaintiff sought
partition. Defendant claimed that Y did not take a life
estate, but that the will gave her the land in fee, and that
the defendant was the owner of the land sought to be partitioned by virtue of a deed from Y. The lower court dismissed the bill for lack of jurisdiction, and was reversed by
the Supreme Court on the ground that the lower court
should have considered on its merits the question whether
or not Y acquired a fee simple under the will of X. Before
this case the cases which had been presented to the court
were, roughly speaking, of two classes. (1) Where an admitted tenant in common claims the whole of the common
title for some reason, such as actual ouster or sole possession for the statutory period. In such a case, both, or all
parties are claiming under a common title, the only question being as to the extent of the estate claimed. Here the
statute would clearly seem to confer jurisdiction.4 (2) There
were those cases where one of the parties claims, not the whole
of the common title, but claims from a different source, i.e., an
independent, hostile claim, going to the whole of the propWJ~iseley . Findlay, 3 Rand. 361. 15 Am. Dec. 712 (1825).
2 Carberry v. Railroad Co., 44 W. Va. 260, 28 S. E. 694 (1897) ; Smith
1

yard, 58 W. Va. 98, 51 S. E.

v. Vine,

871 (1905).

3 Hamrick v. Dodrill, 104 W. Va. 490, 140 S. E. 479 (1927).
, Cecil v. Clark, 44 W. Va. 659, 30 S. E. 216 (1898).
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erty involved, and adverse to the title under which partition is sought to be made. In such case it seems equally
clear that the adverse claimant should not be compelled to
submit his title to a court of equity, but the parties should
first determine their rights at law. 5 The principal case,
however, presents a new situation, and seems to be a combination of the two cases. The defendant is a tenant in
common with the plaintiff, if there is any property to be
divided, and if the plaintiff's construction of the will is
correct the defendant would be entitled to his share under
the common title from X. But the defendant is not claiming under this common title. In fact he denies that a common title exists. And if the defendant's construction of thq
will -is the correct one, he is not compellable under the
statute to make partition because his claim is under a deed
from a stranger. Therefore he says that the court has no
jurisdiction to settle the controversy. To justify the decision of the principal case, namely that equity can determine the question of title that is raised therein, it must appear as a jurisdictionalfact that the party or parties against
whom partition is sought are tenants in common, joint tenants or co-parceners. 6 But that is the very thing that the
defendant denies, since he claims the whole of the title
under a deed from a stranger, whose title, if any, is adverse
to the one under which partition is sought to be made.
Therefore, upon the determination of the controversy as to
the construction of the will, the basis of the court's jurisdiction must rest. In the principal case the court first assumes
jurisdiction because the plaintiff and defendant are tenants
in common. Then, after having made the assumption which
is necessary to give jurisdiction, it proceeds to decide the
very question on which the basis of its jurisdiction rests.
This seems to be arguing in a circle. The decision, in reasoning at least, appears to be a departure from the line of
past decisions7 construing the jurisdiction of a court of
equity in partition proceedings under the statute above
'

Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 18, 26 S. E. 657

(1896) ; Carberry v. R. R. Co.,

supra, n. 2; Smith v. Vineyard, supra, n. 2.
CODE, ch. 79, §1; Smith v. Vineyard, su2zra, n. 2; Davis v. Settle, supra, n.
7 Carberry v. Railroad Co., supra, n. 2; Cecil v. Clark, supra, n. 4; Irvin
Stover, 67 W. Va. 356, 67 S. E1. 1119 (1910) ; Wright v. Pittsman, 73 W. Va. 81,
S. E. 1091 (1912) ; Mahan v. Ferrell, 98 W. Va. 67, 126 S. E. 409 (1925) ; Woodrum
Price, 100 W. Va. 639, 131 S. E. 550 (1926) ; Smith v. Vineyard, supMra n. 2.
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quoted." While the logic of the result is at least questionable, the practical result is not undesirable because it settles in one suit a question which would otherwise require
two proceedings.
-JOHN

V. SANDERS.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-AGENT ACTING FOR UNDISCLOSED
PRINCIPAL-AUTOMOBILE CORPORATION HELD "TRADER" UN-

DER CODE §13, CH. 100.-A number of automobiles were delivered by the owner to a private corporation, engaged in
the general automobile business, under a verbal contract
to store with power to sell. Held, corporation is a "trader"
under Code, §13, c. 100, and the automobiles are subject to
fieri facias lien of the creditors of the corporation. Midland
Investment Corporation v. May e al., 140 S. E. 5 (W. Va.
1927).
This decision raises the question of whether recordation of the contract would protect the owner from the
creditors of the one to whom he had delivered cars for sale,
when the latter was engaged in the general automobile
business. There have been few West Virginia decisions
construing this statute, but as the Virginia Statute (Virginia Code, 1919, §5224) is the same as that of West Virginia
we can look to the Virginia decisions for construction. Recent Virginia cases in which the agent was held "trader"
repeatedly speak of the contract of assignment "not having
been recorded." Capitol Motor Corporation v. Lasker, 138
Va. 630, 123 S. E. 376; Nusbaum v. City Bank, 132 Va. 54,
110 S. E. 363. These decisions indicate that recordation
should be sufficient to protect the interests of the principal,
although earlier decisions seem contra. Hoge v. Turner, 96
Va. 624 at 632, 32 S. E. 291; Partlow v. Lickliter, 100 Va.
631, 42 S. E. 671. The principal case itself indicates that
the creditor might be estopped from asserting his lien, thereby inferring that actual notice would protect the principal.
It is submitted that constructive notice should be sufficient.
The object of the statute is to prevent any evasion of own8 W-

VA. CODE, ch. "9,

§1.
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